10 Jan. 74 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP76B00734R0002

Office of the DD/S&T

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Bill:

Suggest that you read the attached memo from Fred Ikle before your meeting with him at 4:00. I assume the subject of downgrading "fact of" satellite reconnaissance is likely to come up.

Additionally I would like to mention a few things I have learned from a very private source as to what is now going on in ACDA and which might be alluded to by Fred this afternoon.

- Some members of ACDA are pressing Fred to try for membership on USIB and/or NRO Excom. I believe that membership on either body would be inappropriate and cause problems for you in the long run.
- A faction of ACDA is insisting that we are tending to make verification sound too easy. The reverse accusation was prevalent from the old ACDA crowd and since most were dismissed


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necessity to prove that they are even more rigorous on assured verification than the Intelligence Community.itself.

3. Some members of the ACDA Staff are clearly trying to generate dissension between the NSC Staff and ourselves.

I stress that the above comes from a close friend in ACDA and we should be most careful not to indicate that we are aware of these matters. I think it highly advisable that you see Fred alone so that he will have no inhibitions about raising any of these matters or making any complaints which he may have. After you discuss these matters with him we will probably have a better feel for how best to interface with ACDA.



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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

December 21, 1973

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR


> MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Subject: The 156 Committee and National Earth Observation Policy

As you know, the present national political and informational policy governing United States space activities in earth observation was drawn up by the NSAM 156 Committee in 1962. The last major review of this policy was in 1966 in the context of the non-military applications of earth sensing. The review concluded that the 1962 policy was valid in terms of protecting the National Reconnaissance Program. It also concluded that NASA should proceed with its planned experimental programs.

Since 1966, the nation has witnessed major advances in the use of space, specifically in the areas of national security, domestic application and international cooperation. I believe that it is now time, especially because the civilapplication programs have sufficiently matured, to update the present national policy. I am particularly interested in assuring that the continuing ability of the United States to use space freely for arms control verification is not jeopardized by decisions or actions which are focused on single segments of the national space effort.

Implications of the recent decisions with respect to partial decompartmentalization of satellite-obtained photo-reconnaissance, and the downgrading of "the fact of satellite photo reconnaissance" to Secret must be kept in mind in connection with the proposed review.



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The MBFR regotiations demonstrate continuing concern and pressure, on the part of our NATO allies, in obtaining information about and from "national technical means." A review of our policy in respect to such pressures, its modification, or reaffirmation is very much in order, both to deal with our allies and to work out a preferred approach on verification issues in the Vienna talks.

Accordingly, I propose that the NSAM 156 Committee undertake a review and make recommendations with respect to the following:

- a.) An update assessment of the arms control and intelligence implications of earth observation activities in light of disclosure problems and possible political risks.
- b.) A policy sorting out our priorities between arms control, intelligence, and other objectives of earth observation.

Fred C. Ikle

Attachment: Draft Terms of Reference

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR

STUDY OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF EARTH OBSERVATION

- Using NSCA 2454, July 1962, as a point of departure, develop a policy with respect to the United States earth observation programs which will:
- A. Permit the U.S. to sustain the conduct of our national reconnaissance activity for national intelligence and arms control.
- B. Prevent forced disclosure of details of the U.S. verification and reconnaissance program.
- C. Permit the U.S. to avoid confrontations in which U.S. space activity might be condemned as illegal or provocative.
- D. Permit the U.S. to derive maximum benefit from non-reconnaissance earth observations as well as from national reconnaissance end products.
- E. Avoid disruption of space-oriented programs of cooperative scientific investigation.
- F. Facilitate the resolution of any conflicts which might arise between the technical and security requirements of the U.S. reconnaissance activity, domestic requirements, and the international commitments and foreign policy objectives of the United States in a fashion which is in the overall best interests of the national security of the United States.
- II. The policy should incorporate the following:
- A. A comprehensive statement of United States' goals, actions and criteria with respect to political protection and successful continuation of:
 - 1. National reconnaissance and arms control verification.

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- 2. National earth observation for U.S. Government needs.
- 3. National earth observation for domestic and foreign scientific investigations.
- B. Considerations of the activities of the NSSM 72 Committee in respect to sharing the products derived from international civil satellite programs and the relationship of such programs to continuation of U.S. national reconnaissance programs.

Distribution:

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
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